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26 USC SECTION 280E: WILL THE
DRAGON NOW BE SLAYED?
Bill Greenberg & Rebecca Greenberg*
INTRODUCTION
26 USC Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code (“Section
280E”) prohibits the deduction of ordinary business expenses1 for
businesses deemed by the federal government to be drug traffickers
as defined by the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).2 The tax
enactment, which references legislative classifications set forth in
the CSA,3 is specifically designed to serve as a disincentive to socalled drug traffickers—including traffickers in cannabis—who
might otherwise deduct “ordinary and necessary business
expenses”4 from their taxes.5 But this dragon of the tax code
breathes fire on legitimate cannabis businesses—operating in full
compliance with applicable state law—by promoting unintended
consequences. To wit, cannabis businesses are incentivized to
under-report income to offset the impact of being precluded from

* The co-authors Bill Greenberg and Rebecca Greenberg are each partners of The
Greenberg Law Firm, LLP, a litigation law firm with offices in Purchase, New
York and the Bronx. They are each members of the National Cannabis Industry
Association.
1
I.R.C. § 280E (1982) (Ordinary business expenses are expenses incurred
during the ordinary course of business and are categorized under I.R.C. § 162.).
2
21 U.S.C. § 801 (1970) (The Controlled Substances Act was designed to
curtail the unlawful manufacture, distribution, and abuse of controlled
substances).
3
21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012) (defining legislative classifications for Schedule I
and Schedule II Controlled Substances).
4
“Ordinary and necessary business expenses” are categorized under I.R.C. §
162.
5
S. REP. NO 97–494, at 309 (1982).
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deducting their otherwise legitimate business expenses due to
overbroad classifications.6
Ever since California legalized medical cannabis in 1996—
followed by twenty-eight other states—there has been a patent
incongruity between Section 280E’s congressional purpose and the
expansion of state-legalized cannabis businesses in the United
States.7 Consequentially, federal tax policy penalizes businesses,
such as “compliant dispensaries,” that operate legally under
applicable state law to provide cannabis and cannabis-based
products for medical purposes, by taxing businesses at a rate of 70
percent or more, compared to an average business’s tax rate of 30
percent.8
Using the history of cannabis legal enforcement in the United
States, the development of the CSA, and the constitutional
implications of both the CSA and Section 280E as a backdrop, this
article serves to illustrate the unintended and abusive use of Section
280E, which like many legislative pronouncements, came about
from good intentions, but has morphed into a dragon of a tax
provision that torments compliant cannabis businesses, and has long
since strayed from its original objective. Despite Section 280E’s link
to the CSA, a recent decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
may have laid the groundwork for a constitutional challenge to the
6

See, e.g., Olive v Comm’r., 792 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir 2015) (Court
ruled that state compliant cannabis business was precluded from deducting their
ordinary and necessary business expenses pursuant to Section 280E on grounds
that the “trade or business” at issue “consisted of trafficking in controlled
substances.”).
7
The Federal Tax Code prohibits deductions or credits for any amount paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business that
consists of trafficking in controlled substances prohibited by Federal Law. See
I.R.C. § 280E (1982). California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996, “encourage[s]
the federal and state governments to implement a plan to provide for the safe and
affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical need of marijuana.”
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (1996). “Trafficking in controlled
substances” has been found to include distribution of medical marijuana in states
where activity was lawful under state statute. See Californians Helping to
Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v Comm’r., 128 T.C. 173, 182 (2007).
8
Jack Healy, “Legal Marijuana Faces Another Federal Hurdle: Taxes,” N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/us/politics/legalmarijuana-faces-another-federal-hurdle-taxes.html.
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CSA’s applicability to cannabis dispensaries,9 allowing a compliant
dispensary to avoid the tax burden imposed by Section 280E.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides the relevant
history of federal drug enforcement of cannabis in the United States.
This analysis includes a history of drug enforcement prior to the
CSA’s enactment, a review of the CSA House Report and Shafer
Commission Report, two legislative materials significant to the
development of cannabis policy under the CSA, and an analysis of
the gradual development of the cannabis industry in the face of the
CSA, which has occurred in large part as a consequence of the
awareness of cannabis’ medical capabilities in combination with the
onset of a billion-dollar developing cannabis industry. Part II
explores the rise of state laws recognizing the legality of medical
cannabis in certain circumstances and the impact on federal
prosecutions of cannabis as a result of state legislation. Part III
identifies the CSA’s constitutional issues of due process and equal
protection as they relate to the states’ emergent assessment of
cannabis’ therapeutic potential. Finally, Part I# assesses Section
280E in light of those constitutional implications as well as the fresh
significant legal developments resulting most recently from the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States v. McIntosh.10
I. HISTORY OF CANNABIS POLICY
Federal drug enforcement policy has had a remarkable and
complicated history, which has progressed over time and has
resulted in the strict control over cannabis that exists today. A
review of the federal government’s history of drug enforcement
policies is helpful to illustrate a greater understanding of the current
federal cannabis policy.
A. History of Federal and State Drug Enforcement of
Cannabis Before the CSA
The history of United States criminalization of drugs in general
originated in 1887, when Congress restricted opiate importation
9
10

See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id.
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from China.11 Then in 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act
(“HNTA”) became the federal government’s first extensive foray
into drug enforcement policy when it imposed rules for control of
the sale and distribution of various drugs, such as cocaine and
opiates.12 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Secretary
of Treasury were originally responsible for appointing agents to
enforce the HNTA;13 but in 1930, federal enforcement of the HNTA
became the sole authority of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,14 a
1930 bureaucratic outgrowth of the preexisting Bureau of
Prohibition.15
The Bureau of Narcotics lent its knowledge and opinions to the
states as to the dangers of addictive drugs in general and cannabis in
11

See 21 USC §§ 191–93 (repealed 1970). Historian commentators suggest
that the 1887 legislation was promoted by anti-Asian racism then prevalent in
American society, and that the prohibition promoted and underground use of the
drug opium resulting in an unintended consequence—the shift of drug use from
opium smoking to the more nefarious morphine. See Matthew B. Robinson &
Renee G. Scherlen, LIES, DAMNED LIES, AND DRUG WAR STATISTICS 20 (2007);
John Henry Merryman, STANFORD LEGAL ESSAYS 280 (1975).
12
See Harrison Narcotics Tax Act Pub. L. No. 63–223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(“The Harrison Act”). The United States Supreme Court reversed a physician’s
conviction under the Harrison Act ruling that the legislation could only be
enforced as a taxing provision stating, “[o]bviously, direct control of medical
practice in the states is beyond the power of the federal government.” Linder v.
United States., 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925). Though the Tenth Amendment is never
expressly mentioned in the Linder decision, the Court’s motivation seems clearly
influenced by “states rights.” Linder, commonly perceived as a “Lochner era”
decision (in reference to a series of Supreme Court decisions that relied on
substantive due process grounds in striking down laws seen to limit the free
market and infringe on economic liberties), has been largely ignored and
disregarded, except for similar reasoning expressed by the Supreme Court in the
2006 decision Gonzales v. Oregon. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
13
James F. Albrecht, Drug Enforcement Administration, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW, http://enforcement.lawin.org/drug-enforcement-administration/ (last visited
July 6, 2017).
14
Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal
Drug Control Legislation, 22 CATH. U. L. REV. 586, 599 (1972–1973).
15
The Bureau of Prohibition was the federal enforcement agency created to
police the Volstead Act, following enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment. See
Michael A. Lerner, DRY MANHATTAN: PROHIBITION IN NEW YORK CITY 72
(2007).
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particular.16 Spurred on by the Bureau of Narcotic’s stream of
information, each state enacted its own form of drug enforcement
legislation directed toward marijuana.17 Ultimately, in 1922, the
federal government passed the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Import
and Export Act (“Uniform Act”),18 which was the culmination of
twenty years of disparate state laws and periodic and inconsistent
analysis of cannabis and its medical and social consequences.19 By
1937, every state had some form of legal proscription as to cannabis,
yet thirty-five states had adopted the Uniform Act.20
1937 was also the year that Congress first enacted legislation
directed specifically towards cannabis.21 That statute—the
Marijuana Tax Act of 1937—did not expressly prohibit cannabis.22
Rather, it imposed severe regulatory proscriptions along with a tax
which reduced trade in the drug.23 Thirty-two years elapsed before
the federal government again turned its attention to marijuana, when

16

Support for the condemnation and regulation of cannabis was found to
have its roots in police reports and newspaper articles, claiming that cannabis
smoking “made the smoker vicious, was a desire to fight and kill, and that
marijuana smokers are key suspects in horrible crime and perversion.” See
Richard Isralowitz, DRUG USE, POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 133–35 (Greenwood
Publishing Group, 2d ed. 2002). These claims were openly contracted by the
medical community, and in particular the Chief psychiatrist at New York City’s
Bellevue Hospital who stated that the probable cause for assaults was alcohol, not
marijuana. Id.
17
Busted: America’s War on Marijuana: Marijuana Timeline, PBS
FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dope/etc/cron.html
(last visited July 6, 2017).
18
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, 21 U.S.C. § 176 (1922) (repealed
1970).
19
Robert L. Swain, The Status of Exempt Narcotics Under the Uniform State
Narcotic Act, 26 J. AM. PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N 835, 835–39 (Sept. 1937).
20
Id. at 835.
21
The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 74–238, 50 Stat. 551
(repealed 1970).
22
Id.
23
See id. (“There shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all transfers of
marihuana which are required by section 6 to be carried out in pursuance of
written order forms taxes at the following rates . . . ”).
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in 1969, the Supreme Court found the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 to
be unconstitutional in Leary v. United States.24
B. Cannabis and the CSA
Less than a year after Leary, as part of a formal declaration of
its “War on Drugs,” Congress enacted the Controlled Substances
Act (“CSA”), which was Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act.25 Predictably, there were multiple
constitutional challenges to the CSA,26 however all were
unsuccessful.27
The CSA federally criminalized marijuana as a “Schedule I”
controlled substance, meaning that it was illegal to sell,
manufacture, distribute or dispense the drug in any form.28 Congress
defined “marijuana” as%
[A]ll parts of the Cannabis sativa L., whether
growing or not; the seeds thereof; the resin extracted
24

Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 12 (1969) (holding that the Marihuana
Tax Act of 1937 was unconstitutional because it violated the petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and denied the petitioner due
process by placing the burden on defendant to explain that defendant did not have
knowledge of the illegal importation of marijuana).
25
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (1970, 2006).
26
See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1975)
(upholding physician’s conviction for dispensing Dexedrine prescription against
Tenth Amendment claim); United States v. Castro, 401 F. Supp. 120, 125 (N.D
Ill. 1975) (finding a rational basis for classification of cocaine as a narcotic drug
for penalty purposes under the CSA); NORML v. Bell, 488 F.Supp. 123, 143
(D.C. 1980) (rejecting claim that the CSA’s prohibition on private possession and
use of marijuana violates the Constitution’s guarantees of privacy and equal
protection and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
27
See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 107, 108 (9th Cir. 1976)
(holding that marijuana laws had been determined in prior cases to be
constitutional)); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349, 356–357 (2d Cir. 1973)
(holding that the current statutory arrangement of cannabis as a Schedule I drug
“was not so unreasonable or arbitrary” as to be deemed unconstitutional). See also
United States v. Scales, 464 F.2d 371, 375 (6th Cir. 1972) (concluding that
Congress has authority for the CSA under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution).
28
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2010).
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from any part of such plant; and every compound,
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation
of such plant, its seeds or resin.29
Also, the CSA determined that, as a “Schedule I” drug, cannabis
had% (1) “high potential for abuse,” (2) “no currently accepted
medical use in treatment in the United States,” and (3) “a lack of
accepted safety for use of the drug . . . under medical supervision.”30
The enactment of the CSA has given rise to subsequent legislation
involving the tax code to further the CSA’s goal of preventing the
sale, use, and distribution of marijuana.31
C. CSA House Report and the Shafer Commission
With passage of the CSA, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee (“Commerce Committee”) drafted a House Report for
the bill.32 The House Report identified several cannabis “fables%”
“that marijuana is a narcotic;” “that marijuana is addictive;” “that
marijuana causes violence and crime;” “that marijuana leads to
increase in sexual activity;” “that marijuana use leads to heroin;”
and “that more severe penalties will solve the marijuana problem.”33
The House Report also specified that existing medical research
had not yet determined whether marijuana was harmless, including
whether it might cause “panic depression or other psychotic states,”
or whether “occasional use of marijuana is less harmful than
occasional use of alcohol.”34 And so, the CSA was enacted with a
specific requirement for a bipartisan “National Commission on
Marihuana and Drug Abuse” (now known as “The Shafer
Commission”)35 to “conduct a study of marihuana” in the following
areas:
29

21 U.S.C. § 802(16) (2016).
21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1) (2012).
31
See I.R.C. § 280E (1982).
32
See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1603 (1970) (Conf. Rep.).
33
U.S. Congress, Conference Committees, Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, conference report to accompany H.R. 18583,
91st Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 91-1603 (Washington: GPO, 1970).
34
See id.
35
The Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse was established under
the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) passed as part of the Comprehensive Drug
30
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(A)
the extent of use of marihuana in the United
States to include its various sources of users, number
of arrests, number of convictions,
amount
of
marijuana seized, type of user, nature of use;
(B)
an evaluation of the efficacy of existing
marihuana laws;
(C)
a study of the pharmacology of marihuana
and its immediate and long-term effects, both
physiological and psychological;
(D)
the relationship of marihuana use to
aggressive behavior and crime;
(E)
the relationship between marihuana and the
use of other drugs; and
(F)
the international control of marihuana.36
The Shafer Commission was further tasked with conducting “a
comprehensive study and investigation of the causes of drug abuse
and their relative significance.”37 Because the Shafer Commission
was expected to evaluate cannabis, the Commerce Committee
accepted the Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s
recommendation that cannabis be “provisionally” categorized as a
Schedule I drug under the CSA, pending completion of certain
studies that were underway at the time the CSA was originally
passed in 1970.38
The public position taken by the Shafer Commission in its
official report announced that many publicly held beliefs about

Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–513, §601, 84 Stat. 1236,
1280 (1970). The Commission was chaired by Raymond P. Shafer (“The Shafer
Commission”), the former governor of Pennsylvania. See NAT’L COMM’N ON
MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING
iii (Mar. 1972). Per the CSA, he was appointed by the President of the United
States. Id. The Shafer Commission released a provisional report in 1972, calling
for decriminalization of marijuana possession in the United States. Id.
36
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
§601(d)(1)(A-F).
37
Id. at § 601(e).
38
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4556,
4629–30 (quoting opinion letter by Roger O. Egeberg, M.D., to Hon. Harley O.
Staggers (Aug. 14, 2970)).
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marijuana were myths and were not supported by the facts.39 The
Commission generally observed that marijuana users were
submissive, that criminal law was likely not the best mechanism for
dealing with marijuana usage, and that laws pertaining to marijuana
usage should be harmonized with existing law regulating
noncriminalized substances such as alcohol.40 Ultimately, the Shafer
Commission’s conclusions did nothing to amend the CSA’s
“Schedule I” designation of marijuana, in large part due to hearings
held in 1974 by the Senate Judiciary’s Subcommittee to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security Act, also known as the
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.41 The hearings, titled
“Marihuana-Hashish Epidemic and its Impact On United States
Security,” which consisted largely of outdated stereotypes of
cannabis use, served to substantiate Congress’s continued
designation of marijuana as a Schedule I substance.42 Congress’s
approach to marijuana regulation has since also expanded to other
avenues of control, particularly the use of taxation as a means of
discouraging businesses from distributing cannabis.43

39

102.

40

NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, supra FN 35, at 67–

See id. at 103–25.
See Marihuana-Hashish Epidemic and Its Impact on United States
Security: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate the Admin. of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
93rd Cong. 916 (1974).
42
Stereotypes of cannabis use perpetuated during the hearings included
marijuana being “a far more potent carcinogen than tobacco,” “marijuana users
being afflicted by ‘amotivational syndrome’” that could lead to a “total loss [of
users] own will,” making “a large population of cannabis users a serious political
danger” because cannabis “makes them susceptible to manipulation by
extremists.” Id. at 924. The testimony provided during the hearings depicted an
epidemic of a “semi-zombie” population, filled with “young people acutely
afflicted by the amotivational syndrome,” a “partial generation of young people”
who would suffer from “irreversible brain damage” as a result of cannabis use.
Id.; See MARTIN A. LEE, SMOKE SIGNALS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MARIJUANA –
MEDICAL, RECREATIONAL, AND SCIENTIFIC 509 (1982).
43
See I.R.C. § 280E (2012).
41
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D. Internal Revenue Code Section 280E

Ever since income taxation in the United States became viable
with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913,44 the federal
government has used its taxing power as a means of implementing
economic regulation as well as social policy.45 One of those social
policies has been the goal of shielding the public from narcotic and
other dangerous drugs. Congress drafted Internal Revenue Code
provision 26 USC Section 280E for that purpose—to impose a
handicap and barrier to criminal enterprises involved in illegal drug
trafficking,46 including marijuana.47
26 USC Section 280E came about in an unusual way. Prior to its
enactment, a bizarre tax court decision in Edmonson v.
Commissioner ruled that an admitted criminal drug trafficker could
deduct business expenses in calculating federal income tax, just as
if drug trafficking were any other legitimate business.48 In fact, the
taxpayer in Edmonson successfully deducted over seventy thousand
44

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
See Jason Furman, If You’re Going to Do Social Policy Through the Tax
Code, Do it Right, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Jan. 24, 2007),
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-24-07tax.pdf.
46
See S. REP. NO. 97-494, at 309.
47
See generally Californians Helping to Alleviate Med. Problems, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 128 T.C. 173, 181–82 (2007) (discussing the policy behind § 280E).
48
In Edmondson v. Comm’r., 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1533 (1981), the U.S. Tax
Court ruled that a tax payer, whose trade or business was illegally selling
amphetamines, cocaine, and marijuana, was legally permitted to deduct his
ordinary and necessary business expenses. The court stated:
From the record as a whole we find that the appropriate portion
of business use of the petitioner’s apartment was one-half of the
two-thirds asserted by petitioner. This is because the allocation
must exclude personal use, both in space and time. We hold that
one-third of petitioner’s rental expense of $2,360, or $787,
constitutes an ordinary and necessary expense of petitioner’s
trade or business and is to be allowed as a
deduction . . . Petitioner’s remaining claimed business
expenses consist of the purchase of a small scale, packaging
expenses, telephone expenses, and automobile expenses. We
hold that these expenses were made in connection with
petitioner’s trade or business and were both ordinary and
necessary. Id.
45
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dollars of business expenses—notwithstanding that the taxpayer’s
gross income49 was admittedly derived from the felonious sale of
cocaine, methamphetamine, and marijuana.50
Recognizing the inequity in Edmondson, Congress enacted
Section 280E, which states in pertinent part that:
“[n]o deduction or credit shall be allowed for any
amount paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business if such trade or
business (or the activities which comprise such trade
or business) consists of trafficking in controlled
substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II
of the CSA) which is prohibited by Federal law or
the law of any State in which such trade or business
is conducted.”51

49

See Edward J. Roche, Jr., Federal Income Taxation of Medical Marijuana
Business, 66 TAX LAW. 429, 437 (2013) (quoting Edmonson, 42 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 1534–35). What further complicates the inquiry as to the constitutional
propriety of Section 280E, is the perplexing distinction it drew between “ordinary
and necessary business expenses” and “cost of goods sold.” The bill jacket,
already acknowledging a potential constitutional deficiency in 1981 at the time of
enactment stated: “[a]ll deductions and credits for amounts paid or incurred in the
illegal trafficking in drugs listed in the [CSA] are disallowed. To preclude possible
challenges on constitutional grounds, the adjustment to gross receipts with respect
to effective costs of goods sold is not affected by this portion of the bill.” S. REP.
NO. 97–494 at 309. For example, the fictional character “Walter White “from the
acclaimed television series “Breaking Bad” would be entitled to deduct the
expense of any chemicals he purchased at the local hardware store in order to
manufacture the methamphetamine he produce, notwithstanding the proscription
of §280 E—quite an unusual outcome from a Congressional policy seeking to
inhibit criminals dealing illegal drugs. See id.
50
This seemingly bizarre outcome arose out of a long recognized axiom—
the federal tax code does not penalize criminal behavior. Comm’r. v Tellier, 383
U.S. 687, 691 (1966). This guiding principle originated in 1966 when the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled “the federal income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction
against wrongdoing. That principle has been firmly imbedded in the tax statute
from the beginning. One familiar facet of the principle is the truism that the statute
does not concern itself with the lawfulness of the income that it taxes. Income
from a criminal enterprise is taxed at a rate no higher and no lower than income
from more conventional sources.” Id.
51
I.R.C. § 280E (1982).
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Congress promulgated Section 280E in furtherance of its
“sharply defined public policy against drug dealing.”52 The policy
behind the provision was that, “[t]o allow drug dealers the benefit of
business expense deductions at the same time that the U.S. and its
citizens are losing billions of dollars per year to such persons is not
compelled by the fact that such deductions are allowed to other legal
enterprises.”53 In short, Section 280E was designed to deter profit
from drug related businesses which has, by virtue of the CSA,
included cannabis related enterprises.
II. THE STATES, MEDICAL CANNABIS, AND CONTINUING CSA
PROSECUTIONS
Medical research on the medicinal benefits of cannabis has
influenced a changing attitude towards cannabis regulation and CSA
prosecutions, and has opened the door to states legalizing cannabis
for medical use. Yet state laws that permit the distribution and use
of cannabis have no control over regulating federal tax policy or
federal criminal law.
A. California 1996 Prop 215
Since the enactment of the CSA, perceptions of cannabis among
the majority of states have clearly reversed course. This cultural and
societal change can be traced back to California’s 1996 ballot
measure Proposition 215 (“Prop 215”), which sought the
legalization of medical cannabis in California.54 Prop 215 passed by
56 percent of the vote,55 legitimizing56 the use of marijuana in the
52

S. REP. NO. 97–494 at 309.
Id.
54
Cal. Proposition 215 (1996) (codified as The Compassionate Use Act of
1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (Deering 2000)).
55
See id.; Proposition 215, SAFE ACCESS NOW, http://safeaccessnow.
net/blog/california-law/proposition-215/ (last visited July 6, 2017).
56
Also, arguably the CSA in any event may explicitly allow such use where
recommended by a duly licensed physician. 21 USC §844(a) reads, “[i]t shall be
unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled
substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid
prescription or order, from a practitioner, while acting in the course of his
53

26 USC SECTION 280E
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modern era for medical purposes where recommended by a
physician for treatment of a number of specific illnesses and
conditions.57 Prop 215 acknowledged medical research which had
found cannabis to be an effective palliative treatment for a host of
medical ailments such as AIDS, anorexia, arthritis, cancer, chronic
pain, glaucoma, and migraines.58
In the wake of Prop 215, other states have adopted their own
“medical marijuana” legislation, including Alaska, Oregon,
Washington, Maine, Hawaii, Nevada, Vermont, Rhode Island,
Montana, New Mexico, Washington D.C., Delaware, Michigan and
New Jersey.59 In the 2016 election, three more states also
legitimized cannabis.60 In short, so far twenty-nine states have found
cannabis legal in some form or another, four additional states have
ballot measures for legalization of medical cannabis, and five states
had ballot measures for the legalization of recreational cannabis use

professional practice.” Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 868 (9th Cir. 2007).
However, incomprehensibly, federal law under the CSA is generally interpreted
to preclude a physician prescribing marijuana. Rather, a physician can
recommend marijuana under the First Amendment. See Conant v. Walters, 309
F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002).
57
See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (Deering 1996).
58
See id.
59
Ala. Ballot Measure 8 (1998) (codified as the Medical Uses of Marijuana
for Persons Suffering from Debilitating Medical Conditions Act, AS § 17.37.010
et seq. (West 1998); D.C. Amendment Act B18-622 (codified as D.C. ST. § 71671.01 et seq. (West 2009); S. 17, 146th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2011); S. 862, 20th
Leg. (Haw. 1999); Me. Ballot Question 2 (1999) (codified as the Main Medical
Use of Marijuana Act, 22 M.R.S.A. § 2421 et seq. (West 2010)); Mich. Proposal
1 (2008) (codified as Michigan Medical Marihuana Act, M.C.L.A. 333.26421 et
seq. (West 2008)); Mon. Initiative 148 (2011) (codified as Montana Medical
Marijuana Act, M.C.A. 50-46-301 et seq. (West 2015); Or. Ballot Measure 67
(codified as Oregon Medical Marijuana Act, O.R.S. § 475B.400 et seq. (1998));
S. 0710, 2015 Gen. Assemb. (R.I. 2015); S. 76, 2014 Gen. Assem. (V.T. 2014);
Wash. Initiative 692 (2015) (codified as West’s R.C.W.A. § 69.51A.005 et seq.
(2015).
60
Ark. Ballot Issue 6 (2016) (codified as The Arkansas Medical Marijuana
Amendment of 2016, A.R. ST. Amend. 98 §1 (2016)); Fla. Ballot Amendment 2
(2016) (codified as West’s F.S.A. Const. Art. 10 §29 (West 2016)); N.D. Statutory
Measure 5 (2016) (codified as North Dakota Compassionate Care Act, N.D.C.C.
§19-24-01 (West 2016)).
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in the November 2016 election.61 In addition, with more medical
research taking place, there has been increasing support in state and
federal governments for the use of marijuana in treating a variety of
conditions.62
61

The twenty-five states that have legalized medical marijuana do not
include those additional sixteen states that have legalized the limited use of
nonpsychoactive cannabinoid compound cannabidol (CBD). 16 States with Laws
Specifically
about
Legal
Cannabidoil
(CBD),
PROCON.ORG,
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=006473 (last
visited July 6, 2017). The five State Ballot Initiatives for recreational use cannabis
are the Arizona Marijuana Legalization Proposition 205; the California Marijuana
Legalization Initiative Proposition 64; the Main Marijuana Legalization Question
1; the Massachusetts Marijuana Legalization Question 4; and the Nevada
Marijuana Legalization Question 2. Az. Proposition 205 (2016); Cal. Proposition
64 (2016) (codified as Cal. Bus.& Prof. Code §26000 (West (2016)); Me. Ballot
Question 1 (2016) (codified as The Marijuana Legalization Act, 7 M.R.S.A.
§2241 (West 2017)); Mass. Ballot Question 4 (2016) (codified as M.G.L.A. 94G
§1 et al (2016)); Nev. Ballot Question 2 (2016) (codified as The Regulation and
Taxation of Marijuana Act, N.R.S. I.P. Question 2 §1 (West 2017)). The four State
Ballot Initiatives for 2016 were the Arkansas Medical Cannabis Act Ballot
Proposal of 2016; the Florida Amendment 2 Ballot Initiative of 2016; the Montana
Medical Marijuana Initiative I-182; and the North Dakota Compassionate Care
Act Initiated Statutory Measure No. 5 of 2016. Ark. Ballot Issue 6 (2016)
(codified as The Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment of 2016, A.R. ST.
Amend. 98 §1 (2016)); Fla. Ballot Amendment 2 (2016) (codified as West’s
F.S.A. Const. Art. 10 §29 (West 2016)); Mon. Medical Marijuana Initiative I-182
(codified as Montana Medical Marijuana Act, M.C.A. §50-46-301 (2016)); N.D.
Statutory Measure (2016) (codified as North Dakota Compassionate Care Act,
N.D.C.C. §19-24-01 (West 2016)).
62
Currently before the U.S. Senate is the Compassionate Access, Research
Expansion, and Respect States Act of 2015 (“CARERS Act”), which would,
among other things, amend the CSA to “provide that control and enforcement
provisions of such Act relating to marijuana shall not apply to any person acting
in compliance with state law relating to the production, possession, distribution,
dispensation, administration, laboratory testing, or delivery of medical
marijuana.” Compassionate Access, Research, Expansion, and Respect States Act
of 2015, S. 683, 114th Cong. (2015-2016). The CARERS Act would also
reschedule cannabis from a Schedule I substance to a Schedule II substance which
would “[p]rohibit a federal banking regulator from: (1) terminating or limiting the
deposit insurance of a depository institution solely because it provides or has
provided financial services to a marijuana-related legitimate business; or (2)
prohibiting, penalizing, or otherwise discouraging a depository institution from
providing financial services to a marijuana-related legitimate business.” Id.
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B. Medical Cannabis and the Developing Cannabis
Industry
In the 45 years since the CSA’s enactment, extensive research
evidence has emerged demonstrating that cannabis has
demonstrably beneficial palliative effects for the treatment of a
myriad group of medical pathologies, including neuropathic pain,
diabetic neuropathy,63 peripheral neuropathic pain,64 reduction in
pain intensity,65 and HIV/AIDS neuropathic pain.66 Moreover,
clinical studies have demonstrated the potential beneficial effects of
medical cannabis use, including: reducing breast cancer

63

See Mark S. Wallace et al., Efficacy of Inhaled Cannabis on Painful
Diabetic Neuropathy, 16 J PAIN. 616, 616–627 (2015).
64
See Barth Wilsey et al., Low-dose vaporized cannabis significantly
improves neuropathic pain, 14 J PAIN. 136, 136–118 (2013); see also M. Serpell
et al., A double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled, parallel group study of
THC/CBD spray in peripheral neuropathic pain treatment, 18 EUR. J. PAIN 999,
999–1012 (2014) (demonstrating statistically significant treatment differences in
[favor] for THC/CBD spray treatment).
65
See Mark Ware et al., Smoked cannabis for chronic neuropathic pain: a
randomized controlled trial, 182 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N. J. E694, E694–701
(Oct. 2010); see also M. Lynch et al., A double-blind, placebo-controlled,
crossover pilot trial with extension using an oral mucosal cannabinoid extract for
treatment of chemotherapy-induced neuropathic pain, 47 J. PAIN SYMPTOM
MGMT. 166 (2014) (suggesting “nabiximols (oral mucosal spray containing
cannabinoids)” may aid “in the treatment of chemotherapy-induced neuropathic
pain”).
66
See Ronald Ellis et al., Smoked medicinal cannabis for neuropathic pain
in HIV: a randomized crossover clinical trial, 34 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY
672–80 (2009); see also Barth Wilsey et al., A Randomized, Placebo-Controlled,
Crossover Trial of Cannabis Cigarettes in Neuropathic Pain. 9 J. PAIN 506, 506–
21 (2008) (suggesting effectiveness of cannabis as an analgesic for neuropathic
pain).
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metastasis;67 reducing tumor size in brain cancer;68 inducing useful
cell death of pancreatic tumors;69 reducing cancer cell viability in
Leukemia;70 reducing clinical symptoms in autoimmune diseases;71
giving positive effect for the treatment of symptoms in multiple

67

See Sean D. McAllister, Pathways mediating the effects of cannabidiol on
the reduction of breast cancer cell proliferation, invasion, and metastasis, 129
BREAST CANCER RES. AND TREATMENT 37, 37–47 (2011); Ryuichi Murase et al.,
Targeting multiple cannabinoid anti-tumour pathways with a resorcinol
derivative leads to inhibition of advanced stages of breast cancer 171 BRIT. J.
PHARMACOLOGY 4464, 4464–77 (2014); see also María M. Caffarel et al.,
Cannabinoids reduce ErbB2-driven breast cancer progression through Akt
inhibition 196 MOLECULAR CANCER 1 (2010) (finding “strong preclinical
evidence for the use of cannabinoid-based therapies for the management of
ErbB2-positive breast cancer).
68
Various studies have been performed to test the potential of cannabis to
combat cancerous brain tumors. See Christina Blázquez et al., Cannabinoids
Inhibit Glioma Cell Invasion by Down-regulating Matrix Metalloproteinase-2
Expressio, CANCER RES. 1945, 1945–52 (2008); Jahan P. Marcu et al.,
Cannabidiol Enhances the Inhibitory Effects of %9-Tetrahydrocannabinol on
Human Glioblastoma Cell Proliferation and Survival, 9 MOLECULAR CANCER
THERAPY 180, 180–89 (2010); Maria Salazar et al., Cannabinoid action induces
autophagy-mediated cell death through stimulation of ER stress in human glioma
cells, 119 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 359, 359–72 (2009); Angelo Vaccani et al.,
Cannabidiol inhibits human glioma cell migration through a cannabinoid
receptor-independent mechanism, BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1032–36 (2005).
69
See Arkaitz Carracedo et al., Cannabinoids Induce Apoptosis of
Pancreatic Tumor Cells via Endoplasmic Reticulum Stress–Related Genes, 66
CANCER RES. 6748, 6748–55 (2006).
70
See RJ McKallip et al., Cannabidiol-Induced Apoptosis in Human
Leukemia Cells: A Novel Role of Cannabidiol in the Regulation of p22phox and
Nox4 Expression, 70 MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY 897, 897–908 (2006).
71
See Ana Juknat et al., Anti-inflammatory effects of the cannabidiol
derivative dimethylheptyl-cannabidiol–studies in BV-2 microglia and
encephalitogenic T cells, 27 J. BASIC AND CLINICAL PHYSIOLOGY AND
PHARMACOLOGY 289, 289–296 (2016); Ewa Kozela et al., Cannabidiol, a nonpsychoactive cannabinoid, leads to EHR2-dependent energy in activated
encephalitogenic T cells, 12 J. NEUROINFLAMMATION 52 (2015); Ewa Kozela et
al., HU-446 and HU-465, Derivatives of the Non-psychoactive Cannabinoid
Cannabidiol, Decrease the Activation of Encephalitogenic T Cells, 87 CHEMICAL
BIOLOGY & DRUG DESIGN 143, 143–153 (2016); Ewa Kozela et al., Cannabinoids
Decrease the Th17 Inflammatory Autoimmune Phenotype, 8 J. NEUROIMMUNE
PHARMACOLOGY 1265, 1265–1276 (2013).
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sclerosis;72 decreasing spasticity in those affected by spinal cord
injury;73 improving survival rates for those affected by traumatic
brain injury;74 having a potential positive effect in treatment of
Alzheimer’s disease;75 showing observable statistical clinical
benefits for those with active irritable bowel syndrome76 and
Crohn’s disease;77 having antidepressant effects;78 and showing

72

See Jody Corey-Bloom et al., Smoked cannabis for spasticity in multiple
sclerosis: a randomized, placebo-controlled trial, 10 CAN. MED. ASS’N. J. 1143,
1143–1150 (2012); see also Jörg Wissel et al., Low dose treatment with the
synthetic cannabinoid Nabilone significantly reduces spasticity-related pain: A
double-blind placebo-controlled cross-over trial, 253 J. NEUROLOGY 1137, 1137–
1341 (2006) (finding the cannabinoid Nabilone “to be safe and easily applicable
option in the care of patients with chronic UMNS (upper motor neuron syndrome)
and spasticity-related pain otherwise not controllable”).
73
See Sepideh Pooyania et al., A randomized, double-blinded, crossover
pilot study assessing the effect of nabilone on spasticity in persons with spinal
cord injury, 91 ARCHIVES OF PHYSICAL MED. AND REHABILITATION 703, 703–07
(2010).
74
See Miriam Fishbein et al., Long-term behavioral and biochemical effects
of an ultra-low dose of D9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC): neuroprotection and
ERK signaling, 221 EXPERIMENTAL BRAIN RES. 437, 437–48 (2012); see also
Raimund Firsching et al., Early Survival of Comatose Patients after Severe
Traumatic Brain Injury with the Dual Cannabinoid CB1/CB2 Receptor Agonist
KN38-7271: A Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Phase II Trial, 73
J. NEUROLOGICAL SURGERY 204, 204–16 (2012) (suggesting improved survival
rates among subjects treated with cannabinoid receptor agonist).
75
See Antonio Currais et al., Amyloid proteotoxicity initiates an
inflammatory response blocked by cannabinoids, AGING AND MECHANISMS OF
DISEASE, June 2016, at 1, 1–8.
76
See Simon Lal S et al., Cannabis use amongst patients with inflammatory
bowel disease, 23 EUR. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY 891, 891–96
(2011); see also Adi Lahat et al., Impact of cannabis treatment on the quality of
life, weight and clinical disease activity in inflammatory bowel disease patients:
a pilot prospective study, 85 DIGESTION 1, 1–8 (2012) (“[T]reatment with inhaled
cannabis improves quality of life in patients with long-standing CD (Chron’s
Disease) and UC (Ulcerative Colitits)).
77
See Timna Naftali et al., Cannabis Induces a Clinical Response in Patients
With Crohn’s Disease: A Prospective Placebo-Controlled Study, 11 CLINICAL
GASTROENTEROLOGY AND HEPATOLOGY 1276, 1276–1280 (2013).
78
See Abir T. El-Alfy et al., Antidepressant-like effect of %+tetrahydrocannabinol and other cannabinoids isolated from Cannabis sativa L,
95 PHARMACOLOGY BIOCHEMISTRY AND BEHAVIOR 434, 434–42 (2010).
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promise in treatment for opiate dependence that specifically target
cannabinoid-opioid system interactions.79
Also, as an increasing number of states have begun to recognize
that cannabis should not be treated as wholly illegitimate, multiple
businesses have arisen in those states supplying varied products and
medical treatments derived from cannabis and a number of its
constituent chemical components known as Cannabinoids:80 Delta9-tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”),81 Cannabidiol (“CBD”),82
Cannabinol
(“CBN”),83
Cannabichromene
(“CBC”),84
79

See Jillian L. Scavone et al., Impact of Cannabis Use During Stabilization
on Methadone Maintenance Treatment, 22 AM. J. ON ADDICTIONS 344, 344–349
(2013).
80
See State Marijuana Laws in 2017 Map, GOVERNING MAGAZINE (Jan. 30,
2017), http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medicalrecreational.html; see also Oier Aizpurua-Olaizola et al., Evolution of the
Cannabinoid and Terpene Content during the Growth of Cannabis sativa Plants
from Different Chemotypes, 79 J. NAT. PRODUCTS, 324, 324 (2016) (stating that
there are known to be at least “113 phytocannabinoids” in Cannabis stavia plants).
81
See Janet E. Joy et al., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE
SCIENCE BASE 59 (1st ed. 1999) (“Cannabinoids, especially THC, can modulate
the function of immune cells in various ways ––in some cases enhancing and in
others diminishing the immune response.”).
82
Cannabidol (CBD) is currently the leading non-psychotropic
phytocannabinoid in autoimmune and neurological studies, and has been shown
to relieve convulsions, inflammation, anxiety and nausea. See Diana Kwon, Can
Cannabis Treat Epileptic Seizures?, SCI. AM. (Jan. 22, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/can-cannabis-treat-epileptic-seizures
/.; Guide To Using Medical Cannabis, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS,
http://www.safe accessnow.org/using_medical_cannabis (last visited July 6,,
2017). The compound has received national attention in recent years in the
development of “Charlottes Web,” a cannabis extract that has been shown to
reduce epileptic seizures in children with Dravet Syndrome. See Hannah Osborne,
Charlotte Figi: The Girl Who is Changing Medical Marijuana Laws Across
America, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 22, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/charlottefigi-girl-who-changing-medical-marijuana-laws-across-america-1453547.
83
Cannabinol (CBN) “is a metabolite of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) with
potential immunosuppressive and anti-inflammatory activities.” Cannabinol,
NAT’L CANCER INSTITUTE-NCI DRUG DICTIONARY, https://ncit.nci.nih.
gov/ncitbrowser/pages/home.jsf;jsessionid=F45AB2D815AB57F3FE62D1BEF
F620FED (last visited July 6, 2017).
84
Cannabichromene (CBC) is a non-psychotropic phytocannabinoid that has
been found to have a variety of different uses from creating sedative calming
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Cannabigerol (“CBG”),85 and Tetrahydrocannabivarin (“THC#”),86
to name a few. Billion-dollar enterprises have begun to create such
diverse products as cannabis infused topical balms, lotions,87 soaps,
lubricants, and sprays; human and animal edibles in the form of
capsules,88 beverages, dog biscuits, and human snacks and
desserts;89 and cannabis concentrates such as oils, waxes, dabs,90 or
powders, which are generally ingested or smoked in vapor form.91
effects to promoting the analgesic effects of THC. See Medicinal Cannabinoid
FAQ: What are THC, CBD, CBN, CBC and . . . ?, PURE ANALYTICS (Dec. 12,
2011), http://pureanalytics.net/blog/2011/12/12/medicinal-cannabinoid-faq-what
-are-thc-cbd-cbn-cbc-and-&'. It has been found in mice to selectively reduce
inflammation-induced gastrointestinal hyper motility. See Angelo A. Izzo et al.,
Inhibitory effect of cannabichromene, a major non-psychotropic cannabinoid
extracted from Cannabis sativa, on inflammation-induced hypermotility in mice,
166 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1444 (2012). It has also been found to stimulate the
growth of brain cells by stimulating neural stem progenitor cells. See Noriko
Shinjyo & Vincenzo Di Marzo, The effect of cannabichromene on adult neural
stem/progenitor cells, 63 NEUROCHEMISTRY INT’L 432, 432–37 (2013).
85
Cannabigerol (CBG) has sedative effects and antimicrobial properties, and
lowers intraocular pressure. See Mitchell Colbert, Cannabinoid Profile:
Cannabigerol (CBG), THELEAFONLINE, http://theleafonline.com /c/science/2014
/07/ cannabinoid-profile-crash-course-cbg/. It has also been shown in mice to
hamper colon cancer progression in vivo and selectively inhibit tumor growth in
colon carcinogenesis. See Francesca Borrelli et al., Colon carcinogenesis is
inhibited by the TRPM8 antagonist cannabigerol, a Cannabis-derived nonpsychotropic cannabinoid, 35 CARCINOGENESIS 2787 (2014).
86
Tetrahydrocannabivarin (THCV) has been shown in mice to amerliorate
insulin sensitivity in obesity, showing THCV to be a potential treatment against
obesity-associated glucose intolerance, type 2 diabetes and related metabolic
disorders. See E.T. Wargent et al., The cannabinoid %+-tetrahydrocannabivarin
(THCV) ameliorates insulin sensitivity in two mouse models of obesity, 3
NUTRITION & DIABETES 1 (2013).
87
Such as Dixie brand Elixir’s, Muscle Relief Lotion and Muscle Relief
Balm. See DIXIE, http://dixieelixirs.com /products/topicals/ (last visited July 6,
2017).
88
Such as Canna-Pet Advance hemp supplements. See CANNA-PET,
https://canna-pet.com (last visited July 6, 2017).
89
Such as Love’s Oven cookies, brownies, crackers, and gummies. See
LOVE’S OVEN, http://lovesoven.com (last visited July 6, 2017).
90
Such as Deviant Dabs Rosin. See LEAFLY, https://www.leafly.com/
products/details/deviant-dabs-deviant-dabs-rosin (last visited July 6, 2017).
91
See Lane Tr, Powdered Cannabis: The Next Big Thing?, HERB.CO (Jan.
21, 2016), http://herb.co/2016 /01/21/will-powdered-cannabis-next-big-thing/.
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With the influx of cannabis-related businesses and enterprises
arising from the increase in medical research showing the benefits
of cannabis, comes the increasing disparity in Section 280E tax
implications between cannabis related businesses as opposed to
other financial enterprises. Cannabis businesses are restricted from
deducting basic expenses, including rent, employee salaries, utility
bills, legal fees, trade association fees and independent contracting
fees.92
Also, despite the medically acknowledged advances and
research, and notwithstanding the findings of the Shafer
Commission Report, the findings of the House Report, and that
twenty-eight states now accept the legitimacy of cannabis as a
medically beneficial treatment with respect to myriad diseases and
challenging medical conditions, the CSA has not rescheduled
cannabis; cannabis remains classified federally as a Schedule I drug,
which warrants continuing federal criminal prosecutions.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS OF THE CSA AND INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE § 280E: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION
Notwithstanding the disparity in tax treatment under Section
280E for cannabis-related enterprises compared to other taxable
industries, the CSA, as well as IRC Section 280E, implicate
constitutional concerns.
A. Constitutional Issues
It can be credibly argued that federal law does irrationally
distinguish between cannabis and noncannabis businesses—
suggesting strongly that the cannabis business may have redress on
constitutional grounds.93 In other words, scheduling cannabis as a
Schedule I drug—making it a federal crime under the CSA to
92

Healy, supra note 8.
See, e.g., Tom Huddleston, Jr., The Marijuana Industry’s Battle Against
the IRS, FORTUNE (Apr. 15, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/04/15/marijuanaindustry-tax-problem/ (noting that some legal professions believe that Section
280E creates an “unconstitutional burden” on cannabis industries by effectively
subjecting them to a different tax code than other taxed industries).
93
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possess cannabis—may violate a compliant dispensary’s due
process and equal protection rights.94 Likewise, Section 280E
should also be vulnerable to challenge on the same constitutional
grounds, as Section 280E’s applicability to cannabis is premised
upon the CSA scheduling cannabis as a Schedule I substance.
First, there is a fair question whether the CSA’s scheduling of
cannabis as a Schedule I substance threatens a “fundamental right;”
to wit, the right to choose and have available palliative health care
and treatment recommended by respected, legally licensed and
authoritative health professionals.95 Such a “fundamental right” is
akin and analogous to the “right to privacy,” underpinning the well
accepted “woman’s right to choose”96 and the fundamental right to
refuse medical care.97
Superficially, the scheduling of any drug under the CSA scheme
would seem hardly relevant to the right to terminate pregnancy. But,
the Supreme Court has ruled that, where the fundamental right of a
woman to terminate her pregnancy is in all practicality degraded by
a state policy affecting the provider of the medical treatment,98
vindication of the patient’s fundamental right requires that the state
policy be reversed.99 Compliant cannabis dispensaries could readily
analogize disturbance of a cannabis patient’s right to medical
treatment—by oppressive, unwarranted threats of criminal
prosecution—to a governmental policy effectively shutting down
94

Equal protection requirements apply to the federal government through the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954).
95
See Diederik Lohman et al., Access to pain treatment as a human right,
BIOMED CENT., Jan. 2010, at 1, 1–9.
96
See Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973); ACLU, THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE: A
FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY 1–4 (Fall 2000), https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/
ACF4E49.pdf.
97
See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
98
Texas statute H.B.2 would have required providers at abortion clinics to
have admitting privileges at a local hospital no more than thirty miles from the
clinic; this requirement and other onerous requirements effectively caused closure
of fifty percent of the clinics providing abortion services in Texas—effectively
placing undue burden upon the fundamental right of a woman’s right to choose in
that state. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300–01
(2016).
99
See id.
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abortion clinics. For example, throughout the United States,
physicians are restricted from legally prescribing cannabis for
patients that they believe would benefit from this treatment modality
because the CSA has made cannabis a Schedule I substance, thereby
making it illegal for a physician to make such a prescription.100
Instead, physicians are solely permitted to “recommend” the use of
cannabis to treat specific medical conditions, premised upon the
right to free speech under the First Amendment.101
If a patient does have a fundamental right to medical treatment
consonant with the laws of a state,102 and such medical treatment is
shown to be effectively precluded by a federal criminal statute, it
may be difficult to draw a distinction between the constitutional
rights of a cannabis dispensary and the constitutional rights of an
abortion clinic. In which case, were an effective constitutional
challenge to the CSA’s scheduling of cannabis as a Schedule I drug
mounted by a compliant dispensary, it would be not be surprising if,
applying strict scrutiny or even the less restrictive “undue burden”
standard,103 such classification was found unconstitutional on either
or both substantive due process and equal protection grounds.104
100

See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012).
See Conant v Walters, 309 F3d 629, 640 [9th Cir 2002] (physicians are
entitled to commercial speech protection under the First Amendment in the
recommendation of cannabis use to patients).
102
Is that outcome now only a matter of time? The Ninth Circuit would seem
to suggest such is the case stating:
For now, federal law is blind to the wisdom the future day when
the right to use medical marijuana to alleviate excruciating pain
may be deemed fundamental. Although that day has not yet
dawned, considering that during the last ten years eleven states
have legalized the use of medical marijuana, that day may be
upon the sooner than expected. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d
850, 866 (9th Cir. 2007).
103
See Michael Dorf, Symposium: Abortion is still a fundamental right,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan 4, 2016, 11:28 AM) http://www.scotusblog.com/2016
/01/symposium-abortion-is-still-a-fundamental-right/.
104
Across the street from a cannabis dispensary, a traditional pharmaceutical
company could be selling non-cannabis medicine as treatment for anxiety, posttraumatic stress syndrome, etc. Yet, only the cannabis dispensary would be
subject to the financial impediment imposed by Section 280E for selling cannabis
based medicine prescribed by licensed physicians in the state. This inconsistency
could well generate a successful equal protection claim, particularly were the
101
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That analysis could also be used reasonably by compliant
dispensaries to avoid the discriminatory tax burdens imposed by
Section 280E. Certainly, a compliant dispensary, operating legally
pursuant to all applicable business rules and regulations, might
argue that it is being unfairly treated when its net income is radically
reduced by imposition of a tax obligation not placed upon other
business enterprises.
Even were strict scrutiny not applied, the government’s position
would appear vulnerable under rational basis review. The
scheduling of cannabis as a schedule I substance under the CSA
could be challenged by a cannabis dispensary operating in full
compliance with applicable state law. And, any challenge to such
scheduling could be supported by several relatively recent
developments. In 2009,105 the U.S. Attorney General’s office
released a formal memorandum for “selected” U.S. Attorneys
(“Ogden Memo”) directing these attorneys not to “focus federal
resources” on the prosecution of individuals “whose actions are in
clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws
providing for the medical use of marijuana.”106 Similarly, on August
29, 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a Memorandum
constitutionality of Section 280E subjected to strict scrutiny and the government
that obligated to bear the burden of proof.
105
It should be noted that the Attorney General had already been precluded
by the Supreme Court from interfering with Oregon state law permitting physician
assisted suicide. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 274–75 (2006). There,
the Attorney General sought to prevent Oregon physicians from using drugs
regulated by the CSA for voluntary termination of life. Id. at 248–49. The
Supreme Court held that the CSA had no applicability to use of drugs sanctioned
by state law stating that:
The Government, in the end, maintains that the prescription
requirement delegates to a single executive officer the power to
effect a radical shift of authority from the States to the Federal
Government to define general standards of medical practice in
every locality. The text and structure of the CSA show that
Congress did not have this far-reaching intent to alter the
federal-state balance and the congressional role in maintaining
it. Id. at 275.
106
DAVID W. OGDEN, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS IN STATES
AUTHORIZING THE MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA 1–3 (Oct. 19, 2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medicalmarijuana.pdf [hereinafter OGDEN, INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS].
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written by James M. Cole (“2013 Cole Memo”)107 outlining
“priorities to be considered” as a matter of prosecutorial discretion,
directing that “prosecutors should continue to review marijuana
cases on a case-by-case basis and weigh all available information
and evidence including but not limited to whether the operation’s
demonstrably in compliance strong and effective state regulatory
system.”108
In December 2014, Congress enacted the Hinchey-Rohrabacher
Medical Marijuana Amendment,109 which prohibits federal funds
from being used to prevent states from implementing their own laws
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of
medical marijuana.110 In the 2015 case of United States v. Marin
Alliance for Medical Marijuana,111 a federal judge in the Northern
District of California interpreted the Hinchey-Rohrabacher
Amendment to preclude the federal government from enforcing an
injunction of a medical cannabis dispensary’s business activities
unless the dispensary’s activities violated California law, stating%
as long as Congress precludes the Department of
Justice from expending funds in the manner
proscribed by Section 538 [The HincheyRohrabacher Medical Marijuana Amendment], the
permanent injunction will only be enforced against
MAMM [cannabis dispensary] insofar as that
107

It should be noted that the 2013 Cole Memo is still in effect, despite
Current Attorney General Jeff Sessions convening a Task Force on Crime
Reduction and Public Safety (“Task Force”) to evaluate the best legal approach
to enforcement of cannabis. As of the date this article went to print, the Task Force
assembled by Attorney General Sessions has offered no new recommendations to
cannabis policy. See Sadie Gurman, “Mari,uana Tas* )orce Undercuts &ard
Line by Attorney 'eneral Sessions,” INSURANCE JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2017),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/08/08/460437.htm
108
JAMES M. COLE, GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT 1–3
(2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf
[hereinafter COLE, GUIDANCE REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT].
109
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L.
No. 113-235, § 538, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014) [hereinafter the Hinchey-Rohrabacher
Amendment].
110
See id.
111
United States v. Marin All. for Med. Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039
(N.D. Cal. 2015).
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organization is in violation of California ‘State laws
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or
cultivation of medical marijuana.112
In short, a compliant dispensary could well succeed in avoiding
a criminal prosecution under the CSA on substantive due process
and/or equal protection grounds—arguing that the statute’s
application to a compliant dispensary is not “rationally related to any
legitimate state interest.”113 After all, now all three branches of the
federal government—(1) the legislative branch with the HincheyRohrabacher Amendment, (2) the executive branch with the Ogden
Memo and the 2013 Cole Memo, and (3) the judicial branch with
the 2015 federal court decision in Marin Alliance—have determined
that a compliant cannabis dispensary should not be sanctioned for
dealing with a Class I substance under the CSA.114 Once again, if
the CSA is vulnerable to such a constitutional challenge, so should
Section 280E have the same infirmity.

112

Id. at 1047–48.
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
114
See Hinchey-Rohrabacher Amendment, supra note 109; OGDEN,
INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS, supra note 106, at 1–3; COLE, GUIDANCE
REGARDING MARIJUANA ENFORCEMENT, supra note 108, at 1–3. The taxpayer
would have the burden to establish that Section 280E serves no rational purpose.
And, while historically few such challenges have successfully overcome this
burden, the Supreme Court has found a number of state statutes unconstitutional
on this ground. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (discussing
that violation of equal protection by amendment to state constitution designed to
protect solely homosexual persons from discrimination); Quinn v. Millsap, 491
U.S. 95, 106 –07 (1989) (showing that equal protection offended irreparably by
state statute requiring ownership of real property for appointment to government
board); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 27 (1985) (showing that equal
protection was violated by tax distinction between in-state and out-of-state
purchasers of motor vehicles); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,
883 (1985) (striking down statute directing discriminatory tax burden on out-ofstate insurers on equal protection grounds); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230
(1982) (holding that undocumented aliens could not be excluded from public
school education by state statute).
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B. Has State Law Now Emerged to Protect a Compliant
Dispensary from a CSA Prosecution?

A compliant dispensary should be shielded from criminal
prosecution under the CSA by state law, analogous to a Tenth
Amendment defense. The Tenth Amendment states% “The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”115 In contrast, the Supremacy Clause affirms that
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.116
Resolution of the inherent conflict between the Tenth
Amendment and the Supremacy Clause has always largely
depended upon whether the federal government enacted legislation
as to the specific issue being challenged, that is, whether federal law
preempts state law—in this instance, as to matters within scope of
the Commerce Clause.117 Historically, Tenth Amendment
challenges to the CSA met with no success; courts have routinely
ruled that the regulatory scheme promulgated by the CSA was well
within the scope of the Commerce Clause.118 In fact, the Supreme
115

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
117
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
118
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding scope of
Tenth Amendment pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act to extend
intrastate); Montana Caregivers Ass’n, LLC v United States, 526 Fed. App’x. 756
(9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting claim by medical marijuana growers that the
Constitution protects a fundamental right to grow medical marijuana);
Sacramento Nonprofit Collective v. Holder, 552 Fed. App’x. 680 (9th Cir. 2014)
(rejecting claim of fundamental right to distribute and use medical marijuana and
claim that federal enforcement of the CSA violated Equal Protection);
Stubblefield v. Gonzales, 150 Fed. App’x. 630 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim
that CSA as applied to growers of medical marijuana under state law was
unconstitutional as it fell within Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce); United States v. Washington, 887 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Mont. 2012)
(holding that prosecution did not violate 10thAmendment in prosecuting
116
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Court in Gonzales v. Raich declared that the CSA preempted any
state enactment on the subject of cannabis—unless Congress
expressed a manifest change of heart.119 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Gonzales was hardly surprising as it followed a long line
of lower court decisions which had also rejected any constitutional
challenge to the CSA.120
But now Congress seems to have had that “change of heart.”
Congress’s Hinchey-Rohrabacher Amendment manifestly directs
that state law controls CSA’s applicability to a compliant
dispensary—as particularly demonstrated by two recent decisions in
California.121
defendant under the CSA); Marin All. For Med. Marijuana v. Holder, 866 F. Supp.
2d 1142, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding plaintiffs “failed to establish likelihood
of success on merits of their claim that application of the CSA to growers and
users of marijuana for medical purposes, as otherwise authorized by California
Compassionate Use Act, violated their right to substantive due process”); United
States v. Zhuta, No. 09CR357A, 2010 WL 5636212, at *1, *5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 29,
2010) (rejecting defendants’ claims that classification of marijuana as Class I
Substance under CSA was irrational and that CSA was unconstitutional under the
10th amendment).
119
See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 22.
120
See, e.g., Pearson v. McCaffrey, 139 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D.C. 2001)
(rejecting physicians’ claim that federal ban on prescribing or recommending
medical marijuana was unconstitutional and violated the Administrative
Procedure Act); Kuromiya v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(finding CSA a valid exercise of power under the commerce clause, and did not
violate the right to privacy, and that prohibition on marijuana did not violate the
9th or 10th Amendments).
121
See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1177–80 (9thCir. 2016)
(holding that if the federal government prosecutes individuals, who are authorized
by state laws to distribute, possess, or cultivate medical marijuana, “it has
prevented the state from giving practical effect to its law for non-prosecution of
individuals who engage in the permitted conduct” and thus section 542 of the
Continuing Appropriation Act of 2016 “prohibits the Department of Justice from
spending funds from relevant appropriations acts for the prosecution of
individuals who engaged in conduct permitted by the State Medical Marijuana
Laws and who fully complied with such laws”); United States v. Marin All. For
Med. Marijuana, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1039, 1047–48 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that a
permanent injunction against a dispensary, which was premised upon the CSA,
could only be enforced to the extent that the dispensary was “in violation
of . . . [California] State laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession or
cultivation of medical marijuana”).
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First, in United States v. Marin Alliance for Medical Marijuana
a federal district court in the Northern District of California
expressly bowed to state law in a decision concluding the epic
thirteen-year-battle between the federal government and the Marin
Alliance cannabis dispensary.122 The court found that a permanent
injunction—premised upon the CSA—could only be enforced to the
extent that the Marin Alliance dispensary was “in violation
of . . . [California] State laws that authorize the use, distribution,
possession or cultivation of medical marijuana.”123 In short, the
court in Marin Alliance acknowledged that, although cannabis may
be scheduled as a Schedule I drug, nonetheless, California state law
does control. At least as far as the Marin Alliance court was
concerned, a compliant dispensary could rely upon state law to bar
a federal enforcement action premised upon the CSA.124
The decision in Marin Alliance was challenged, when125 in
March of 2016, a California district court judge in United States v.
Chavez126 came to an entirely different conclusion, denying a
motion to dismiss a criminal indictment under the CSA on HincheyRohrabacher grounds.127 Chavez arose from a cannabis possession
charge, which the defendant challenged premised upon the passage
of the Hinchey Rohrabacher Amendment. The Chavez court
acknowledged that the Hinchey-Rohrabacher Amendment may
have curtailed appropriations of funds for prosecution of select cases
brought under the CSA, but had not “repealed or amended the
Controlled Substances Act to accomplish that goal in a
straightforward manner.”128
The conflict between Marin Alliance and Chavez starkly
demonstrates two separate approaches to the impact of the HincheyRohrabacher Amendment upon the continued efficacy of the CSA
on criminal prosecutions for possession of marijuana.
122

See Marin All., 139 F. Supp. 3d at 1041, 1047–48.
Id. (citing Continuing Appropriation Act of 2015, Pub. L. 113-235, 128
Stat. 2217 (Dec. 14, 2014) (amended 2016)).
124
Id. at 1045–46.
125
See United States v. Chavez, No. 2:15-CR-210-KJN, 2016 WL 916324,
at *1, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2016).
126
Id. at *1.
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Id.
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Id. at *2–3.
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IV. UNITED STATES V. MCINTOSH
In United States v. McIntosh, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the conflict between the Marin Alliance and Chavez
decisions and directed lower courts to follow a procedural
mechanism which is premised upon the principle that, where
cannabis prosecutions are concerned, state law may override the
CSA.129
McIntosh concerned nine consolidated criminal cases all
brought by the federal government under the CSA, alleging cannabis
possession and use.130 The McIntosh court acknowledged the
conflict posed by the Hinchey–Rohrabacher Amendment: on the one
hand Congress has announced that compliant dispensaries could not
be prosecuted with federal funds; on the other hand, cannabis
remains a Schedule I substance.131 The McIntosh court decided that
each criminal defendant was entitled to “an evidentiary hearing to
determine” whether the defendant’s conduct “was completely
authorized by state law.”132 In short, the court in McIntosh held that
California law could trump the CSA if the compliant cannabis
dispensary operated in full accord with applicable state law. A long
and detailed footnote in the McIntosh decision reminds defendants
that “Congress could restore funding tomorrow, a year from now, or
four years from now . . . . “133 In which case, the footnote continues,
“the government could then prosecute individuals who committed
offenses while the government lacked funding.”134
A. The “McIntosh &earing”
What may next arise when such a McIntosh “evidentiary
hearing” is conducted is not entirely clear; the McIntosh courts did
not expressly rule that an indictment be dismissed if a criminal
129

United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 168–69.
131
Id. at 1179.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 1179 n. 5. It should be noted that the Hinchey–Rohrabacher
Amendment to the federal budget has now been made effective through
September, 2017.
134
Id.
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defendant’s use of marijuana is found to be “completely authorized
by state law.”
Further, it is interesting to ponder whether the burden of proof
and procedure at such an ostensible “McIntosh hearing” will—
analogous to the usual suppression hearing—be on the government
by a preponderance of the evidence.135 Or, is the allegation that a
compliant dispensary was conducting its cannabis business in
violation of applicable state law an element of the alleged crime
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt?
The answers to these and other thorny questions must await
further judicial clarification. But as to the Tenth Amendment, which
has always been a “battle cry” for states’ rights adherents, it seems
apparent that the Tenth Amendment may now play a role in
shielding compliant dispensaries from further federal prosecutions
under the CSA.
B. McIntosh and Section 280E
Compliant dispensaries will now clearly rely upon the HincheyRohrabacher Amendment in avoiding tax burdens premised upon
Section 280E. But, should the ruling in McIntosh affect enforcement
of Section 280E? In other words, can the compliant dispensary also
rely upon the Hinchey–Rohrabacher Amendment in avoiding tax
burdens premised upon Section 280E?
The Ninth Circuit’s decision has set up an undeniable hurdle
which the federal government must clear before a criminal
prosecution can proceed under the CSA, that is, whether a
“McIntosh” hearing must occur to determine whether the cannabis
135

See United States v. Lou Huang You, 198 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, (1980); United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548
(1968); United States v. Calvente, 722 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d. Cir. 1983)); see also
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975) (stating that “the burden of showing
admissibility [of seized items or statements by a defendant] rests, of course, on
the prosecution”); Matlock, 415 U.S. at 178–79 (stating that “the controlling
burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no greater burden than
proof by a preponderance of the evidence”) (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S.
477, 488–89 (1972)); Calvente, 722 F.2d at 1023 (stating that “the government
has the burden of proving consent voluntarily given by preponderance of the
evidence” (citing Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548–49 (1968)).
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defendant has complied with applicable state law. Under McIntosh,
were the defendant found to be compliant, the prosecution would
likely be precluded.136 Rationally, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) should have the same burden before requiring a compliant
dispensary to lose deductions due to enforcement of Section 280E.
There should be no distinction between the CSA as a basis for
criminal prosecution and Section 280E as a basis for compelling
payment of artificially enhanced taxes. When the IRS commences a
deficiency proceeding in tax court, or defends a federal court refund
action, the federal government should have the same McIntosh
hurdle to clear. The same constitutional rules should apply.
Congress enacted IRC Section 280E in 1982,137 15 years before
California’s Proposition 15 began to alter the legal landscape among
the states concerning cannabis.138 As such, the policy underlying
Section 280E—serving to disincentive drug trafficking—is
outdated.139 Indeed, with the onset of uncontested medical research
pointing to a myriad of therapeutic benefits of cannabis, the efficacy
of the Congressional policy attendant to Section 280E’s enactment
pertaining to cannabis is undoubtedly undercut.

136
137
138
139

McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1179.
I.R.C. § 280E (2012).
Id.
See supra, note 3.
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The dragon 26 USC Section 280E should no longer impede140
the legitimate economic development141 of a medical marijuana
industry devoted to those with an established need for cannabis’
therapeutic and palliative capabilities. To find otherwise clashes
with purposes underlying the CSA, the congressional policy in the
Hinchey-Rohrabacher Amendment, constitutional principles of
substantive due process, equal protection, and the Tenth
Amendment, and the now undoubted clinical demonstration of
cannabis as a recognized medical therapy. This dragon should be
slayed when set upon compliant cannabis dispensaries.
CONCLUSION
The
Hinchey-Rohrabacher
Amendment
expressing
congressional intent on the issue of the CSA enforcement of
cannabis violations, coupled with the recent judicial ruling in the
ninth circuit of McIntosh, can well be used by tax payers in the
future to avoid imposition of tax liability premised upon Section
280E of the Internal Revenue Code. Yet, while the McIntosh ruling
is a promising development for the cannabis industry, its legitimacy
is largely premised upon the continued existence of the Hinchey140

Perhaps 2017 will also usher in a new regime for the banking and
cannabis industry. A February 14, 2014 U.S. Department of the Treasury
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network “Guidance Memo” inhibits banking
institutions from servicing cannabis industry account holders by requiring
complicated record-keeping—entitled “Suspicious Activity Report” (“SAR”)
documents—at three levels. See Memorandum from the United States Dep’t of
the Treasury Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, BSA Expectations Regarding
Marijuana-Related Bus. FIN-2014-G001 (Feb. 14, 2014). (“A financial institution
is required to file a SAR if . . . the financial institution knows, suspects or has
reason to suspect that a transaction conducted or attempted by, at, or through the
financial institution: (i) involves funds derived from illegal activity or is an
attempt to disguise funds derived from illegal activity; (ii) is designed to evade
regulations promulgated under the BSA, or (iii) lacks a business or apparent
lawful purpose.”).
141
One cannot ignore the sad history of Prohibition where an ill-advised
federal statute and the Eighteenth Amendment drove legitimate business out of
the alcohol trade leading to the development of organized crime, a scourge still
with us. See DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL, THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION,
Scribner (2010).
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Rohrabacher Amendment, which requires yearly renewal by
congress. Absent such annual renewal, the Drug Enforcement
Administration and the Department of Justice would be free to fund
prosecutions against compliant cannabis businesses, leaving those
cannabis businesses who comply with state law with little basis to
challenge Section 280E. Needless to say, in light of these recent
developments, the timing to challenge Section 280E is ripe.

